РАДИСЛАВ ПП. I РИМСКО-РУССКИЙ RADISLAV PP. I ROMANO-RVTHENICVS Doctrine of Just Defense Just War Doctrine as Defined by the Diocese of Rome-Ruthenia the Holy Apostolic See of Sts. Peter, Andrew, Stephen, and Mark United Roman-Ruthenian Church I. Foundational Principles War, even when justified, is always tragic. Thus, we must begin with an ontological claim: All violence is a manifestation of the Fall of Mankind. Even when morally justified, violence and other forms of harm damage communion. II. Just War Criteria In order to be just from a moral standpoint, the following criteria remain essential in their entirety: 1. There must be legitimate authority 2. There must be just cause 3. There must be right Intention 4. There must be proportionality in action and response 5. The response and action must be a last resort 6. There must be a reasonable chance of success 7. There must be discrimination, i.e., protection of noncombatants These conditions provide moral structure and prevent anarchy. However, they are the minimum conditions and require augmentation. III. Augmentations A. Spiritual Discernment as Precondition It is essential to ask whether intention is right and whether the soul is sober. Yet, a government in panic is morally unreliable. Therefore, before force is justified, leaders must ask whether they are acting from any of the following: 1. Fear 2. Humiliation 3. Wounded national or cultural ego 4. Desire for dominance B. Defense Is a Duty of the State It is the duty of governing authority to restrain evil. While a Christian individual may accept martyrdom, a state has no right to martyr its citizens through passivity. Thus, endurance of personal insult is not equivalent to endurance of systematic harm to one’s people. Failure to defend the innocent may itself constitute injustice. C. Violence Always Carries Moral Residue Even justified defense requires mourning, repentance, and spiritual sobriety after victory. While a righteous victory may be celebrated, it must be without triumphalism, with thanks to God, and without hatred or ill will towards the former enemy in order to be consisten with the Orthodox moral consciousness. Even when external criteria are met, a war may still wound the soul of a nation if undertaken without humility, repentance, and a sincere desire for reconciliation. Justice in form does not guarantee purity of heart. IV. Application to Modern Non-Kinetic Warfare While past conflicts were so often in the category of kinetic warfare, the world has changed so that not only has the nature of kinetic warfare changed, the methods and mechanisms for doing harm to individuals, nations, peoples, and cultures have expanded beyond pure physical violence. Such mechanisms can, especially but not exclusively at scale, be just as damaging and harmful to states, organizations, and peoples. Modern conflict includes such non-kinetic weapons as cyber attacks on hospitals or infrastructure, economic sanctions intended to destabilize civilian populations, information warfare aimed at political collapse, proxy encirclement strategies, weaponized migration, and energy strangulation, among others. The moral question is whether these forms of aggression are morally equivalent to kinetic attack. In many cases, they are. If, for example, a cyberattack disables hospitals, the moral reality is not less grave because no missile was fired. If sanctions intentionally aim to collapse a society’s civilian stability, they are not morally neutral. And, while migration itself is a legitimate concept, and we are called to welcome the stranger among us, migration can be weaponized by a state or other actors to destabilize another state or institutions. Thus we must state and acknowledge that aggression is defined by effect, not by weapon type. V. Preemptive Action Here lies the most difficult matter to discern: When is anticipatory defense justified? Preemptive action requires just cause, which can be understood in the most broad terms as responding to imminent injury. However, threats often develop gradually. This can include the classical cae of troop buildup near borders or weapon placement. However, it can also include techniques such as proxy militarization or cyber infiltration preparing future attack, among others. Thus we must state that anticipatory action requires the following: 1. Moral certainty of aggressive intent 2. Evidence of concrete preparatory action 3. Imminence (even if non-kinetic) 4. Exhaustion of realistic peaceful remedies 5. Proportional defensive aim Nevertheless, preemption based on speculation is inherently unjust. It is not enough simply to say that we expect, assume, or think that an actor, state or otherwise, might do something. Neither is it enough by itself to act out of fear. And it is certainly unjust to act preemptively out of hatred for the other party. Moral certainty does not require absolute metaphysical certainty, but it must rise above conjecture, ideological suspicion, or strategic rivalry. It must be grounded in verifiable patterns of action, credible capability, declared hostile intent, and concrete preparatory steps that render delay gravely dangerous. Probability alone is insufficient. Structural competition is insufficient. Historical grievance is insufficient. Preemption against morally certain, imminent large-scale harm may be defensible. However, the burden of proof is extremely high. Preventive war undertaken to forestall a hypothetical future imbalance of power, absent imminence, is unjust. Fear of eventual weakness does not constitute just cause. VI. Small vs Large States Moral responsibility scales with power. A large power has greater capacity for patience, has more nonviolent tools available, and must exercise restraint proportionate to strength. A small state, on the other hand, may face existential risk more quickly, may lack strategic depth, and may justifiably act sooner when survival is credibly threatened. However, smaller status does not eliminate the obligation of discernment. Fear must not be mistaken for certainty. It is also essential to acknowledge that a small state may become a proxy for a large state to attempt to do harm to another large state. This becomes a relevant factor in discerning just cause. Yet, the universality of moral law does not change between great and small powers. What differs is prudential threshold, not moral principle. Greater power increases responsibility for restraint; lesser power may increase urgency, but never removes the obligation of discrimination, proportionality, and just cause. VII. Application of Insult Personal insult may be endured, depending on the nature of the insult and circumstances. However, if harassment destroys livelihood, creates psychological harm, or produces systemic injustice, proportionate response becomes justified. Similarly, in geopolitics, rhetorical hostility by itself does not equate to war or by itself constitute a legitimate casus belli. However, actions such as but not limited to acsustained economic strangulation, infrastructure sabotage, proxy militarization, or political destabilization operations may legitimately constitute aggression. VIII. Proportionality of Response When an action is deemed just, there are still limits on force or other action that may be applied, whether kinetic or otherwise. The response must be proportionate to the injury or threat, aim to restore order, minimize civilian harm, and avoid escalation beyond necessity. IX. Proxy Warfare and Indirect Aggression When a powerful state uses smaller states to encircle or destabilize another, or to engage in active kinetic warfare, three moral questions arise: 1. Is the smaller state acting freely? 2. Is there clear coordination aimed at aggression? 3. Is the perceived threat speculative or demonstrable? Only demonstrable hostile structuring justifies defensive countermeasures. Suspicion alone does not. X. A Spiritual Warning Pertaining to Siege Psychology Geopolitics in their current state easily produce a permanent siege mentality. This is spiritually corrosive. And, it can happen in any time, not just the present. A nation that defines itself primarily by threat becomes paranoid, ooverreacts, and justifies injustice in the name of survival. Nevertheless, the Apostolic faith insists that even real threats must not be allowed to dominate interior life. Fear cannot be the organizing principle of moral decision-making. A state may meet all formal criteria and still sin through interior corruption. Indeed, a permanent narrative of existential threat deforms moral reasoning. It habituates leaders to interpret ambiguity as hostility and rivalry as aggression. Spiritual vigilance therefore requires that states periodically re-examine threat assumptions in light of evidence, lest defensive posture become self-justifying expansion. XI. Final Moral Synthesis Therefore in conclusion, we must affirm the following: 1. The state has a duty to defend the innocent. 2. Aggression includes non-kinetic destruction. 3. Preemptive defense may be justified when aggression is morally certain and imminent. 4. The more powerful a state, the greater its obligation of restraint. 5. All violence, even justified, wounds the human person. 6. Victory does not equal righteousness. 7. Repentance and mourning must accompany even legitimate defense. 8. The Church retains the authority to make moral judgments concerning the justice of wars and the participation of the faithful in them. 9. The Church may impose spiritual discipline upon those who participate in actions judged gravely unjust. 10. The Church does not assume the prudential role of civil governance but speaks prophetically and pastorally in matters of war and peace. Because the salvation of souls is a higher end than temporal security, the spiritual authority of the Church is superior in matters of moral judgment. Therefore, while the state possesses temporal authority to execute military action, it does not possess final authority to define the morality of that action. When the Church definitively judges an act of war to be gravely unjust, the faithful are bound in conscience to obey God rather than men. For every authority is ordered to an end, and higher ends govern lower ones. Since eternal beatitude is superior to temporal peace, the authority entrusted with the care of souls possesses moral primacy over the authority entrusted with civil order. A definitive judgment in this matter must proceed from the supreme ecclesial authority of the Church and must be expressed in a manner intended to bind the conscience of the faithful. Prudential commentary or political preference does not constitute such judgment. No Christian may participate in actions the Church has definitively judged gravely unjust, even under civil command. Those who refuse participation in such cases must be supported pastorally. When confronted with the terrible decision of considering warfare, we must ask consider under what circumstance war is permissible. Our collective conscience and that of state leaders must ask how we can defend without losing our souls. A Christian ruler may be forced to wage war, and soldiers may participate in a just war, but they must do so as one who will answer before Christ. Defined ex cathedra at Rome-Ruthenia in the House of Saints Peter, Andrew, Stephen, and Mark, this 4th Day of March in the 2026th year of the Incarnation. Радислав Пп. I     [Chancery] [Curia] [Main Page]   DISCLAIMER, LEGAL, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICES